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Abstract: The idea of a hybrid bicameral system combining election and sortition is investigated. More 
precisely, the article imagines how an elected and a sortition chamber would interact, taking into account 
their public perception and their competing legitimacies. The article draws on a survey of a 
representative sample of the Belgian population and Belgian members of parliament assessing their 
views about sortition in political representation. Findings are combined with theoretical reflections on 
election’s and sortition’s respective sources of legitimacy. The possibility of conflicting legitimacies and 
mutually detrimental interactions leads to considerations of the effects of different possible distributions 
of power between the chambers as a crucial determinant of their interactions and perceived legitimacy.  
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I nt roduct i on 
John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright propose a hybrid bicameralism, with one chamber composed 
of elected politicians and the other of ordinary citizens chosen by sortition. Though they 
envision interactions between the two chambers as a “creative tension,” the question of 
intercameral relations deserves more careful attention. We argue that the chambers would not 
only have different virtues but also different legitimacies, which might become particularly 
conflictual if each chamber has the power to veto the proposals of the other, as Gastil and 
Wright recommend. If the elected chamber proves less popular than the sortition one, the 
legitimacy of elections might come into question. In turn, elected representatives might try to 
discredit the sortition representatives as, for example, lacking experience or accountability.  
To imagine these intercameral relations, picture a triangular relationship among the two 
chambers and the public. To understand how those relationships might develop, we wanted to 
get a preliminary measure of the public support for each mode of selection. In addition, we 
sought to grasp current political support for sortition among elected officials. We investigated 
these questions in Belgium, where the idea of sortition has received particular attention in 
recent years. We conducted a survey among a representative sample of the Belgian population 
and Belgian Members of Parliament (MPs) to assess their views of sortition, if it were used for 
political representation. 
As we explain in detail later, the results show that a pure sortition chamber will be difficult 
to achieve politically, due to limited public support and even lower support among politicians. 
Our findings also suggest that, once installed, a sortition chamber might continue to face 
resistance and opposition from the political class. Hence, to test the viability of  Gastil and 
Wright’s sortition chamber proposal, we must imagine intercameral relations and their effects 
on the perceived legitimacy of the two chambers.1 Beyond our survey findings, we also offer 
theoretical reflections on the respective legitimacies of elections and sortition—and on their 
potential antagonisms. This leads us then to consider the effects of different possible 
distributions of power between the chambers as a crucial determinant of their interactions.  
Conflicting legitimacies are not a problem per se. For instance, in existing democratic 
systems, the relations between legislative, executive, and judiciary powers involve constant 
tension between their respective rationales. Nonetheless, it cannot be taken for granted that 
the coexistence of an elected and a sortition chamber would strengthen, rather than weaken, 
the overall balance of legitimacy in a democratic system. Sortition could challenge the very 
basis of electoral legitimacy, so intercameral interactions must be considered carefully.  
We begin by explaining why Belgium is the right site for investigating these issues, then 
we present the results of our survey. In the second section, we explore the complementary 
virtues and competing legitimacies of elections and sortition in theoretical terms. We then draw 
on our data regarding legitimacy perceptions—and on more general observations about 
bicameral interactions in contemporary democracies—to consider different potential 
distributions of power between the two chambers and their potential political consequences. 
We will review four institutional scenarios: (1) an elected and a sortition chamber having 
identical powers; (2) the elected one being subordinated; (3) the sortition one being 
subordinated; and (4) a single mixed chamber, which combines elected and sortition 
representatives. We weigh the pros and cons of these four options in light of both our data and 
our theoretical considerations. 
  
                                                 
1 The analysis in terms of desirability, achievability and viability is borrowed to Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real 
Utopias (London: Verso, 2010). 
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Public and Political Perception of Sortition in the Belgian Context 
 
Belgium provided an ideal setting for our surveys because the political debate on sortition in 
that country has received considerable public attention.2 In addition to proposals made by 
scholars and activists, several politicians recently advocated the use of random selection to 
draw citizens into political decision making. Some have proposed, more specifically, using 
sortition to select members of the Senate (i.e., the Belgian upper house). Hence, debates have 
addressed the competence and legitimacy of randomly selected representatives, as well as 
the best institutional design for including lay citizens in the legislative process. Some argue for 
a parliamentary committee chosen by sortition, others for a mixed Senate combining election 
and sortition, and others prefer a full sortition Senate. 
If the public debate about a sortition chamber is now vivid in Belgium, it does not mean 
that the proposal has a popular majority. Most Belgian political parties have refused to take an 
official position on the idea, and current proposals lack serio us legislative follow-up. 
Nonetheless, versions of the idea keep reappearing in media and political debates. 3  
To get a more precise estimate of political and public support for a sortition chamber, or 
other variations on that idea, we surveyed members of the regional and national parliaments 
in Belgium, along with a representative sample of Belgian citizens. For MPs, data were 
collected via online and paper questionnaires from June to August 2017, with a response rate 
of 26 percent (N = 124). (Appendix Table A1 shows sample demographics.) The survey 
company iVox collected a representative online sample of citizens (N = 966). 
Our survey examined whether, in light of the contemporary mistrust of the political class, 
respondents would show more confidence in a sortition chamber than an elected one. We also 
measured public and political support for the general idea of a sortition chamber, as well as for 
the idea of a chamber that mixed randomly selected citizens and elected politicians—a method 
close to the model of the Irish Constitutional Convention.4 Finally, because of our interest in 
power distribution between chambers, we asked who should make the final decision when the 
two chambers disagree.  
The main results of our survey appear in Figure 1, which includes the exact question 
wording for both politicians and citizens. (Appendix Figure A1 displays these results in more 
detail.) As for MPs, the data show a highly critical posture towards the use of sortition for the 
appointment to parliament: 77% disagree with installing a sortition chamber.5 Nearly two-thirds 
of politicians (65%) also oppose a mixed chamber. When considering the scenario of a 
disagreement between elected and sortition chambers, 89% want the elected chamber to 
make the final decision, with 75% having that view if the second chamber is mixed. Finally, 
only 5% place more confidence in sortition than in an elected chamber, with 17% remaining 
neutral. (That is the highest neutrality score among our five questions.) 
                                                 
2 For a contemporary account of this debate in Belgium, see Reuchamps, Min, Didier Caluwaerts, Jérémy Dodeigne, 
Vincent Jacquet, Jonathan Moskovic and Sophie Devillers. “Le G1000 : une expérience citoyenne de démocratie 
déliberative”. Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP, no. 2344-2345 (2017). 
3 For example, debates continue on a 2016 proposal from Green MPs in the lower house, who advocate forming 
parliamentary commissions composed equally by elected and sortition citizens, with decisions requiring a majority 
in both groups. 
4 See Reuchamps, Min, and Jane Suiter, eds. Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe. Colchester: ECPR 
Press, 2016, chapter 2. 
5 In the Belgian context, the question was likely to be understood as a question about the possibility of introducing 
a sortition chamber alongside an elected one. However, we recognize a regrettable ambiguity in the formulation of 
the question. This results from our attempt to make the questions understandable for people who have no prior 
knowledge of sortition and little understanding of bicameralism. 
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For the representative sample of citizens that we surveyed, the picture is quite different, 
though we do find majority support for neither sortition nor a mixed chamber. Many 
respondents remained neutral, with a high of 40% unsure whether to make elected or sortition 
members the final authority. This suggests considerable room for movement in public opinion, 
if the debate on sortition intensifies. When citizens do take a position, we find a much closer 
split between those who favor or oppose these propositions. More citizens oppose than support 
the sortition chamber (40% vs. 29%), but a plurality (47%) favor a mixed chamber, with only 
one-quarter of respondents opposing it. 
 
 Figure 1: Distribution of Survey Responses for Politicians (N = 124) and Citizens (N = 966) 
 
Source: Authors’ survey results. 
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To check whether support for sortition or mixed chambers varied by respondents’ 
partisan identity or demographic characteristics, we conducted chi-square tests of 
independence. Table 1 shows several statistically significant differences. (More detail appears 
in Appendix Figures A2-A6.) The most striking result was that of the fourteen Green MPs 
surveyed, all but two supported establishing a mixed chamber. As for gender, for samples of 
both politicians and citizens, women were less critical than men towards sortition and more 
supportive towards a mixed chamber. In the public sample, 74% of younger respondents (≤ 
34) supported a mixed chamber, compared to less than two-thirds (63%) of their older 
counterparts (≥ 35). Finally, citizens with the highest levels of formal education and income 
were least supportive of sortition or a mixed chamber—by margins of ten to thirty percent—
relative to respondents with the lowest income and education levels. (For detailed breakdowns, 
see Appendix Figures A5-A6.)  
  
Table 1: Chi-square coefficients of the support for a sortition (Q1) and mixed (Q2) chamber 
Tested variable df 
Politicians Citizens 
Sortition chamber Mixed chamber Sortition chamber Mixed chamber 
Party affiliation 4 1.05  32.03 ** - - 
Gender 1  5.28 ** 5.86 ** 1.88  5.67 ** 
Age 2 0.09 0.35 1.87  7.03 ** 
Education 2 - -  28.55 **  4.81 * 
Income 2 - -  18.61 **  8.58 *** 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
  
These results come at a moment in history where neither a sortition nor mixed chamber 
exists, nor after a robust debate of such proposals. Nonetheless, the data offer insight into the 
near-term prospects of these ideas in the Belgian context—or perhaps in any similar country 
when these ideas first begin to percolate. 
First, MPs strongly oppose the idea of a full sortition chamber, whereas citizens remain 
ambivalent. By comparison, a mixed chamber appears more achievable. A plurality of citizens 
favor it, and fewer MPs oppose it. Whether a mixed chamber could serve as a stepping stone 
towards full sortition is a question our survey cannot address. 
Second, politicians’ strong opposition to the introduction of sortition confirms that the 
proposal is not yet on the legislative agenda – Greens being an interesting exception. We were 
not surprised that the proposal is resisted by those who have a vested interest in the status 
quo. In other words, our results can be interpreted as a confirmation that elites see sortition as 
an existential threat. 
 Third, there is openness to sortition from the part of citizens. Although there is no clear 
indication that citizens would be willing to trust a sortition chamber more than an elected one 
(nor that they trust the latter more), they tend to show more trust in sortition than MPs do. What 
is more, elections possibly benefit from a psychologically documented status quo bias or path 
dependency. Whereas sortition, still often perceived as bizarre by people unaware of its 
historical precedent, could gain popularity if it were to become common practice. 
 Not only do these results provide some information regarding the achievability of a 
sortition chamber, they will also feed into our theoretical analysis of intercameral relations. 
Before moving to that,  we try to shed more light in the following section on the reasons that 
might explain political resistance to sortition even though it has virtues complementary to 
elections.  
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Complementary Virtues and Competing Legitimacies 
 
We agree with Gastil and Wright that sortition and elections have complementary virtues, but 
our reasoning differs from theirs. By increasing social and cognitive diversity, sortition helps 
reducing the risks of biased decisions. By freeing representatives from party allegiances and 
electoral pre-commitments, it creates conditions for high-quality deliberation. Relative to 
sortition, however, elections offer a more inclusive space for public participation, leave more 
room for contestation, include a dimension of choice in the selection of representatives, and 
provide an (admittedly deficient, yet institutionalized) accountability mechanism.6 
There are thus good reasons for trying to combine these respective virtues and for 
resisting the temptation to abolish the elected chamber.7 Yet nothing guarantees that this 
combination of elections and sortition will be easy, nor that it will have beneficial effects. The 
creation of a sortition chamber might further decrease the perceived legitimacy of elected 
representatives.  The unequal public interactions between charismatic elected and 
unexperienced randomly selected citizens might discredit the latter. Tension between two 
chambers with veto power might result in political deadlock, to the benefit of those unjustly 
favored by the status quo. Taken together, these dynamics could undermine public trust in the 
entire legislative system.   
One cannot expect peaceful interaction between the two chambers because elections 
and sortition embody competing and mutually undermining conceptions of representation. 
Electoral politics is conceived as a matter of meritocratic competition. A good politician ideally 
demonstrates political commitment, conviction, persuasive skill, and strategic acumen. The 
electoral process should bring to power the best representatives, or, at least, the ones voters 
want most from the available options. In sortition, everyone is seen as endowed with a capacity 
for political judgment and able to take active part in collective decision making. Given these 
conflicting models, tensions arise immediately because sortition challenges the elitist electoral 
model and the distinctive legitimacy of elected politicians.  
The use of sortition also might increase public hostility towards political parties. Modern 
party politics has many deficiencies, but parties also play positive roles in articulating a 
multiplicity of societal demands in coherent political programs. Parties organize political 
majorities and public opposition.8 Yet parties’ legitimacy is closely tied to electoral legitimacy 
and the conception of representation as competition, which is probably why our survey showed 
Belgian MPs so strongly opposed to the creation of a sortition chamber. 
The important point is that parties and elected representatives will have incentives for 
trying to delegitimize the sortition chamber.9 If the latter becomes more popular, the incentives 
could change, as the elected class might become afraid that attacking sortition would 
undermine its own popularity.10 Yet, in the period of transition towards a widely accepted use 
of sortition in political representation, it is very important to address this issue of conflicting 
                                                 
6 Accountability in sortition is even lower when such bodies use secret ballots, as advocated by Gastil and Wright. 
On the limitations of sortition compared to elections, see Pourtois, Hervé. “Les élections sont-elles essentielles à la 
démocratie ?”. Philosophiques 43, no. 2 (2016); Vandamme, Pierre-Etienne, and Antoine Verret-Hamelin. "A 
Randomly Selected Chamber: Promises and Challenges." Journal of Public Deliberation 13, no. 1 (2017). 
7 As suggested by Terril Bouricius in his contribution to this special issue, for example. 
8 For a good defense of party democracy, see Urbinati, Nadia. Representative Democracy: Principles and 
Genealogy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006, ch. 1.  
9 A point also made by Terril Bouricius in his contribution to this special issue. He adds that sortition representatives 
would likely not be properly equipped to defend themselves. 
10 This is analogous to why elected officials are reluctant to attack the initiative and referendum process in countries 
and states where it exists, given the general popularity of such direct democratic processes. We thank John Gastil 
for this suggestion. 
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legitimacies. Failure to do so risks jeapordizing the potential benefits of pairing elections with 
sortition, and it could de-legitimatize completely the very idea of sortition. Thus, we turn to the 
question of how to reshape existing political institutions such that this conflict becomes an 
asset, rather than a risk, for democratic legitimacy. 
 
Intercameral Relations 
 
Besides perceived legitimacy, the crucial factor to either increase or decrease the potentia l 
intercameral competition will be the distribution of power between the two chambers. Political 
scientists traditionally draw a distinction between strong and weak bicameralism.11 The main 
difference between both is not the selection process but the veto power of the second chamber. 
Either it is an absolute veto (a legislative proposal has to be ratified by both chambers) or a 
suspensive veto (the second chamber can at most delay the legislative process).12 In the 
former case, the second chamber performs functions of checks and balances, such as 
promoting stability, reducing the power of the majority and of the agenda setter, and making 
corruption more costly. When operating with only a suspensive veto, a body’s function is mostly 
deliberative, as it works to improve the quality of proposed legislation through amendments or 
anticipation of the other chamber’s reaction.13 
It is an absolute veto power that Gastil and Wright envision for their proposed sortition 
chamber. Though it is interesting to imagine how the veto power by itself would affect 
intercameral relations, another part of the picture consists in considering methods for 
overcoming disagreements between chambers. As we focus on Gastil and Wright’s proposal, 
we shall limit ourselves in this paper to the examination of the power distribution between the 
chambers. After having considered the potential effects of an equal distribution of power, we 
consider the three other alternatives mentioned earlier: a consultative elected chamber, a 
consultative sortition chamber, and a (single) mixed chamber. 
  
Equal Power: Fight for Public Trust or Mutual De-legitimation? 
 
The main attraction of giving equal power to both chambers comes from the fact that it 
empowers the sortition body, elevating it to the same standing as its elected counterpart. One 
might be tempted to see this arrangement as most likely to reap the full benefits of both election 
and sortition. If both types of representation enjoyed a similar degree of public trust (as in our 
survey), this might seem like the perfect compromise. 
We have our doubts, however. Our main worry relates to a more general criticism of 
strong bicameralism. If a bill has to pass two chambers to become law, with each having an 
absolute veto, it becomes more difficult to overcome the status quo, compared to unicameral 
or weak bicameral systems.14 By itself, this consideration could induce realist utopians to not 
give veto power to a sortition chamber, or to remove the veto power of the elected one. If 
                                                 
11 Lijphart, Arend. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. 
12 Przeworski, Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2010; 
Schwartzberg, Melissa. Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014. 
13 See Tsebelis, George, and Jeannette Money. Bicameralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 
chapter 1. In the particular case of a legislature by lot, the second (sortition) chamber would also have the function 
to provide an assessment of law proposals by an informed (yet non-expert) and reduced public opinion, which might 
have the desirable effect to force the elected chamber to justify its disagreements with the sortition chamber to the 
wider public. 
14 Ibidem; Tsebelis, George. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002. 
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capitalism is to be overcome, the status quo does not need unnecessary protections. Equal 
veto powers for both bodies could also induce constitutional rigidity and thereby create 
intergenerational injustices.15 
Two particular aspects of the dual veto are likely to worsen this status quo bias. First, the 
preferences of both chambers could diverge significantly. We expect important disagreements 
between the two chambers because both are likely to become autonomous epistemic 
communities with their own procedures, functioning, and internal power relationships. What is 
more, one advantage of representation by lot is supposed to be its capacity to yield a strong 
deliberative dynamic which is likely to increase the opinion gap with the (less deliberative) 
elected chamber. Again, the net result is making it harder to overturn the status quo. 
Second, the conflictual coexistence of the two chambers would not be mitigated by the 
presence of political parties in both bodies. When sortition and elected representation coexist, 
the coagulant function of cross-chamber party platforms is reduced. One cannot expect a 
sortition chamber to organize itself on partisan affiliations in the same way an elected chamber 
does. Nor can one expect a sortition chamber to follow the political directions of the 
government the same way an elected chamber usually does in a parliamentary system. Across 
the conflicting chambers, legislative votes become more uncertain, the number of negotiating 
rounds increases, and the entire legislative process slows down further. 16 Paradoxically, the 
increased policy stability (or deadlock) that would result from such a dynamic could result in 
even higher social and political conflict.17 
Citizens in countries like the US might be so accustomed to political deadlock that such 
threats do not worry them.18 Nevertheless, the equal power solution presents the greatest risk 
for the competing legitimacies that we referenced earlier: each chamber might be tempted to 
contest the very nature and source of legitimacy of the other. For example, the elected 
chamber could point out the intrinsic incompetence and lack of accountability of the sortition 
chamber, while the sortition chamber could critique the intrinsic elitism and partisanship of the 
elected one. 
This dynamic could produce widely varying results, some of which could benefit the 
political system. Conflict between the bodies could spark a more vivid debate between the 
chambers on policy issues. It could foster a virtuous fight for public trust, if each chamber tries 
to be the “best” representative of the public. The divergence between the chambers could also 
result in a larger autonomy of the representative bodies vis-à-vis the executive branch, in a 
parliamentary system; the sortition chamber would be less subordinated to the government, 
and the elected chamber could use the negotiations between the chambers as a leverage for 
acquiring more autonomy.  
These optimistic scenarios may come to pass, but equally plausible is a race to the 
bottom, in which each chamber discredits the other until the public becomes disgusted with 
both. Structural deadlock could lead an increasing part of the population to think that hybrid 
bicameralism highlights the complementary vices of sortition and election more than their 
virtues. This system could lead people to call for a more efficient political body, led by a 
powerful executive, even if that meant a less democratic government. Given the frequency of 
irony in political history, such unintended consequences are certainly possible.  
                                                 
15 See Gosseries, Axel. “Constitutions and Future Generations”. The Good Society 17, no. 2 (2008): 32-37. 
16 Tsebelis & Money, Bicameralism, p. 104. 
17 An alternative possibility, if the sortition chamber enjoys a high legitimacy, is that public pressure would force the 
elected chamber to compromise, which would mitigate the deadlock. 
18 Path dependency can be a reason to take strong bicameralism as a given, but if this is what grounds Gastil and 
Wright’s choice, one should be careful not to generalize their claim beyond the US context.  
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A Consultative Role for the Elected Chamber? 
 
If one is worried about the conservative effects of strong bicameralism (or about the risks of 
de-legitimation of the sortition chamber by the political class), one alternative institutional 
design subordinates the elected to the sortition chamber. In light of the political resistance to 
sortition expressed in our survey, this might be the least achievable option, politically. Let us 
nonetheless consider its theoretical desirability. 
If the intended benefits of elections are real, and if the complete replacement of elections 
would entail a loss for which sortition cannot entirely compensate, this option requires careful 
design. Sortition must increase the legitimacy of the political system as a whole, not dig the 
grave of elections. 
If the sortition chamber was conceived as (or became) the main chamber, with a mainly 
consultative role for the elected one, prima facie, this empowers sortition without strong 
bicameralism’s drawbacks. What is more, a consultative role does not amount to 
powerlessness: the subordinated chamber (which may keep a constituent role and a power of 
initiative) usually exercises influence through its suspensive veto power.19 The power to delay 
decisions gives the subordinate chamber leverage when its counterpart is impatient to  pass 
the legislation, sometimes due to the unreliability of its majority.20 
Even so, the social and political status of elections would be affected by setting-up a 
surbordinate role. First, if the imbalance of perceived legitimacy between election and sortition 
increases over time (as people become more acquainted with sortition), the public might 
encourage the sortition chamber to ignore the elected one. Second, elections provide a 
moment where political stakes are staged and discussed in the media. Political oppositions 
and interests are made visible. Representatives are tested and must give account of their 
actions. Would these functions endure if citizens had the impression that elections matter even 
less than before? If voter turnout declined, the legitimacy gap between the chambers could 
grow even wider. 
In parliamentary systems, the elected chamber could retain the power to nominate the 
prime minister. The stakes of legislative elections would thus remain substantial—especially 
considering the shift of power, in most democracies, from the legislative to the executive 
branch.21 This would lead to an unprecedented configuration of the relations between the 
executive and the legislative branch, with one chamber having the power to nominate (and 
influence) and the other the power to decide. Yet there would also be a high potential for 
deadlock because governments would have no guarantee of support by the main (sortition) 
chamber. Under such an arrangement, political parties would face strong incentives to recruit 
members of the sortition chamber for the government to gain stability and for the opposition to 
gain strength.  
                                                 
19 In France, for example, the Senate has a subordinate role as it is possible for the government to give the last 
word to the National Assembly. Nonetheless, the Senate exercises influence on decisions even when it has a 
distinct majority, i.e. even when its intervention amounts to political compromise rather than a mere technical 
improvement of the bill. See Tsebelis & Money, Bicameralism, pp. 173-175. 
20 The exact influence of the subordinated chamber depends on the differences of composition between the 
chambers and on the institutional rules defining the so called navette process, i.e. the number of possible 
movements of a bill from one chamber to the other and on the kind of dispute settlement rule that is institutionalized. 
The influence of the second chamber is the lowest where the political orientations of the two chambers coincide 
necessarily, due to the designation process or the electoral calendar, for example (see Manin, Bernard. “En guise 
de conclusion : les secondes chambres et le gouvernement complexe.” Revue internationale de politique comparée 
6, no. 1 (1999), p. 195). Yet in these cases, second chambers tend to be dismantled or reformed. 
21 Papadopoulos, Yannis. Democracy in Crisis? Politics, Governance and Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013. 
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In presidential systems, to the contrary, legislative elections would lose much of their 
appeal. The political stage would be mainly occupied by two actors—an elected president and 
the sortition chamber. At a first glance, such equilibrium could preserve the main benefits of 
elections. On closer inspection, however, elections could be reduced to a presidential 
plebiscitary ritual. In this configuration, there would be a risk of a further shift of power from the 
legislative branch towards the executive if the former is dominated by the sortition chamber.  
  
A Consultative Role for the Sortition Chamber? 
 
Another institutional alternative gives a consultative role to the sortition chamber. In this 
scenario, the sortition chamber could enjoy powers of initiative, second reading, and 
amendment, but the elected chamber would always have the final say. Based on our survey 
results, this might be the arrangement most acceptable to the political class. If the function of 
sortition is primarily to empower lay citizens or mitigate an imbalance of power in favor of elites, 
a subordinate role could appear unsatisfactory. If, however, the sortition chamber is envisioned 
as a deliberative input in the legislative system, a consultative role might be the best possible 
fit. 
Since power resurfaces whenever the stakes are high,22 a subordinate role might be 
most suitable for a sortition body, which would then have less risk of corruption by external 
interests. In the elected chamber, the structures of traditional political parties can provide a 
firewall between the representatives and external pressures, be they legal (lobbies) or illegal 
(bribery). Lacking such protection, a fully empowered sortition body would be more susceptible 
to corrosive external influence. 
If we admit that impartiality and deliberative quality are intrinsically or instrumentally 
valuable, a subordinate sortition chamber might best realize these virtues. By having only a 
suspensive (and not absolute) veto power, the incentive to produce reasoned 
recommendations after high-quality deliberations would be increased.23 
What is more, a consultative sortition chamber could have substantial influence on the 
workings of the elected chamber. We have already mentioned how second chambers gain 
leverage when the elected one fears any further delays. In the particular case of hybrid 
bicameralism, however, the popularity of the second (sortition) chamber might increase its 
influence even more. If a sortition chamber were to garner considerable popular support, 
elected representatives would have a strong incentive to seek its consent—to take into account 
its suggestions for legislative amendments and to take up its legislative proposals. Knowing 
that citizens may reward or punish representatives for failing to follow the recommendations of 
the consultative sortition chamber, the elected majority might be ill-advised to neglect its input. 
Ironically, electoral accountability could thus play in favor of sortition. Yet this will depend on 
the public identification with the sortition chamber, its media coverage, and the effectiveness 
of electoral accountability, which is often denounced as poor—not the least by partisans of 
sortition. 
Even if the deliberative effect of a consultative sortition chamber were real, there are 
risks in this design. The subordinated role might decrease the public’s willingness to serve in 
the sortition chamber.24 If people fail to see the real power of a consultative chamber, it might 
                                                 
22 Shapiro, Ian. Politics against Domination. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 75. 
23 This option is defended in Vandamme & Verret-Hamelin, A Randomly Selected Chamber: Promises and 
Challenges. 
24 As a in-depth study of the reasons for (non-)participation to juries and mini-publics reveals, rates of acceptance 
are higher where citizens feel they will be able to exercise genuine power. Jacquet, Vincent “Explaining non-
participation in deliberative mini-publics” European Journal of Political Research, 56 (3):640-659 (2017). 
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create public anger toward an elite that only pretended to give citizens genuine political power. 
As with the previous arrangements, such drawbacks must be weighed against potential 
advantages. 
 
What About a Mixed Chamber? 
 
The last institutional option features a chamber composed both of elected and sortition 
representatives, as was used by the Irish Constitutional Convention. In the Belgian context, 
several politicians have advocated replacing the current Senate with such a mixed chamber, 
with the first chamber remaining as it is. This option received the least critical reception by MPs 
in our survey, and it received the highest public support. A variant of such a scheme would 
avoid bicameralism’s status-quo bias by creating a unicameral—but “bi-representative” —
chamber.25 
A mixed chamber can mitigate the public battle between professional politicians and lay 
citizens. If both groups have incentives to work together in sub-committees, they could learn 
from each other. The public could observe them cooperating closely, exchanging views, and 
trying to understand each other’s concerns. In light of the contemporary distrust of politics and 
politicians, this could restore public legitimacy to the legislative process.  
Another benefit of a mixed chamber might be that elected politicians who have 
collaborated with lay citizens would be more willing to defend the recommendations of the 
mixed chamber in their parties (in government or in the elected chamber if there is one). This, 
again, would reduce the battle between elected and sortition representatives.  
Again, there are risks. Most of all, sortition might lose its intended benefits if mixed with 
elected representation. Under a unicameral arrangement, this risk would be greatest. The 
sortition representatives would arrive free from party attachments, but parties would have a 
strong incentive to form alliances with these unaligned lay representatives. For parties, it could 
become more appealing to invest time and money in recruiting sortition representatives already 
chosen than in canvassing the general public to attract more voters. If an additional elected 
seat requires winning 50,000 more votes, why not seduce and enroll an independent sortition 
MP instead? In this scenario, we could imagine a case where a small yet opportunistic party 
gathers a plurality of (mostly sortition) MPs while earning only a small fraction of the popular 
vote.  
Preventing such political recruitment is hard to imagine, given that parties and sortition 
MPs would interact on a daily basis and join forces to make majority decisions. Even a rule 
forbidding political careers after a sortition mandate would not solve the problem entirely. 
Coalition building is a natural outcome of political battles. If sortition representatives want to 
weigh on legislative decisions in such a scenario, they will be better off joining existing 
coalitions – or forming new ones. They might retain more independence than elected 
representatives, which would attenuate the drawbacks of party discipline, but this outcome 
would not reap the full fruits of pure sortition. 
We believe things might go differently in a bicameral framework scenario, though only 
where the mixed chamber is subordinate to the elected one. The stakes being lower, party 
competition might be weaker; hence, the temptation to recruit the sortition MPs into parties 
might be lower. 
                                                 
25 Van Reybrouck, David. Against Elections. The Case for Democracy. London: The Bodley Head, 2016, pp. 150-
162. This scenario looks less likely when considering that, historically, bicameralism has often served as a 
compromise between competing forms of representation (See Manin, "En guise de conclusion : les secondes 
chambres et le gouvernement complexe", p. 196). 
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Either way, the mixed chamber faces another hazard—the intellectual domination that 
sortition MPs might suffer when seated amongst professional politicians. One does not even 
need to assume hostile intentions on the part of elected representatives. The fact is that there 
will probably be an asymmetry of experience and self-confidence, which might turn out to be 
detrimental to sortition representatives. If some participants’ voices are perceived as more 
legitimate, or more articulate, deliberation could suffer.26 Empirical evidence on this subject is 
equivocal,27 but to secure high-quality deliberation, such domination must be prevented.  
  
Conclusion 
 
Elections and sortition have complementary virtues that provide promising ground for being 
combined in a bicameral legislature. At the same time, competing legitimacies need to be 
considered when thinking about the intercameral distribution of power. Representative surveys 
of the Belgian population revealed an ambivalent reception of the sortition chamber idea, with 
many citizens still undecided on the question. Our survey of MPs, however, showed strong 
resistance to sortition.  
Those results go along with our theoretical consideration of sortition and election as 
having not only different legitimacies, but also competing—and potentially conflicting—ones. 
The reintroduction of sortition into modern representative systems will be difficult to achieve, 
but sortition will likely face continued resistance once installed.  
For that reason, it is important to try to anticipate the results of potentially conflictual 
intercameral relations under hybrid bicameralism. A crucial factor affecting intercameral 
relations will be the distribution of power between the chambers, which Gastil and Wright 
envision as roughly equal in their proposal. Path dependency can explain their choice for such 
a strong bicameralism, but it is not enough to justify it. When opening the debate on the 
introduction of a legislature by lot, one must also open the debate on this distribution of power. 
We did so by thinking through four scenarios. 
First, we considered an equal power solution. Though it appears as the natural 
combination of the respective virtues of elections and sortition, this institutional design has the 
effect of protecting the status quo, and it could push the two chambers to mutual de-
legitimation.  
Second, we explored the possibility of subordinating the elected chamber to the sortition 
one. Such an option appeared more plausible in a presidential system than in a parliamentary 
one, but either way, it risks political recruitment of sortition representatives, reduced electoral 
legitimacy, and greater transfer of power from the legislative to the executive branch.  
Third, we discussed the scenario of a sortition chamber being subordinated to the 
elected, while playing a deliberative role. Doing so would probably attenuate, but not annihilate, 
sortition’s political impact. The ruling majority might be ill-advised to neglect the input of the 
sortition chamber because this would delay its legislative projects and could even jeopardize 
its future electoral success. Yet, a subordinate role for the sortition chamber might also have 
demotivating effects and engender public frustration.  
Finally, we explored the idea of a mixed chamber composed of sortition and elected MPs. 
The joint work of these two types of representatives could create a positive logic of mutual 
learning and cooperation. But we also stressed the risks of political recruitment and intellectual 
domination of the politicians on the lay citizens.  
                                                 
26 Sanders, Lynn M. "Against Deliberation." Political Theory 25, no. 3 (1997): 347-76. 
27 For findings reporting existing influence, see Flinders, Matthew, et. al. "Democracy Matters. Lessons from the 
2015 Citizens’ Assemblies on English Devolution." The Democracy Matters Project, 2016, pp. 39-40. 
13 
Every one of these power distributions has advantages and drawbacks with important 
consequences for the functioning of the political system. If the utopia of a legislature by lot 
became real, the choice between these options should be made in function of the institutional 
context of introduction and the—transformative—societal aims which the introduction would 
seek to fulfil. 
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Appendix 
 
Five questions, corresponding to those in Figure 1, were asked with exactly the same wording 
in our two surveys. Respondents were provided no additional explanations or context for these 
questions. Table A1 shows the response rates for the MP survey, and Figure A1 shows the 
precise choices of politicians and citizens regarding a sortition and a mixed chamber. Figures 
A2-A6 show the detailed response distributions across partisan and socio-demographic 
dimensions used for the chi-square tests. Support for a proposal was operationalized as the 
sum of those “fully agreeing” an “rather agreeing,” with the same done for opposition. 
Respondents with a neutral position were not taken into account for the chi -square tests. 
 
Table A1: Response rates for survey among regional and federal members of Parliament 
 Sample Population Response rate 
Total 124 473 26% 
Men 79 283 28% 
Women 45 190 24% 
Dutch-speakers 56 234 24% 
French-speakers 56 214 26% 
German-speakers 12 25 48% 
Christian-democrats 29 85 34% 
Greens 14 40 35% 
Liberals 28 106 26% 
Socialists 30 115 26% 
Nationalists 13 87 15% 
Other 10 40 25% 
 
 
Figure A1. Detailed Choices of Politicians and Citizens regarding Sortition and a Mixed Chamber. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure A2. MPs’ Support for a Sortition and a Mixed Chamber by Party Affiliation (with Chi-Squared 
Test). 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
 
Figure A3. Support for a Sortition and a Mixed Chamber by Gender (with Chi-Squared Test). 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure A4. Support for a Sortition and a Mixed Chamber by Age (with Chi-Squared Test). 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
 
Figure A5. Citizens’ Support for a Sortition and a Mixed Chamber by Education (with Chi-Squar. Test). 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure A6. Citizens’ Support for a Sortition and a Mixed Chamber by Income (with Chi-Squared 
Test).Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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